Corporate reporting and speculation fever : credibility in tomorrow\u27s financial statements by Savoie, Leonard M.
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Guides, Handbooks and Manuals American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection 
1969 
Corporate reporting and speculation fever : credibility in 
tomorrow's financial statements 
Leonard M. Savoie 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_guides 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons 
CORPORATE 
REPORTING and 
SPECULATION
FEVER
Credibility in Tomorrow’s 
Financial Statements
LEONARD M. SAVOIE, CPA
Executive Vice President
American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants
Text of address before joint meeting of Los 
Angeles Chapter, California Society of 
Certified Public Accountants; Robert Morris 
Associates; Los Angeles Bank Credit Men’s 
Association—March 3, 1969.
Spring is here again, and back in Con­necticut where I live, tulips will soon 
be coming up in the garden.
Sometimes when I see the green leaves 
and the red or yellow flowers, I think of 
the man who had a tulip worth $4,000.
This tulip wasn’t made of gold or plat­
inum—it wasn’t a piece of jewelry at all. 
It was a real, live tulip, growing in the 
ground, and someone was willing to pay 
—and did pay—the equivalent of $4,000 
for the bulb from which it grew.
As you probably surmise, the transac­
tion I refer to is not contemporary; it took 
place in Holland in the 1630’s.
But that sale was not an isolated trans­
action. On the contrary, there were thou­
sands of sellers and thousands of buyers 
exchanging tulip bulbs at fantastic prices. 
There is a record of one sale that took 
place not for cash but by a swap of goods, 
and the purchaser paid for a single bulb: 
4 oxen, 8 pigs, 12 sheep, 4 barrels of beer, 
1,000 pounds of cheese, one complete bed, 
and a suit of clothes.
The buying of tulip bulbs—not to plant 
and enjoy the flowers but to sell to some­
one else at a higher price—lasted for three 
years. Then the fever passed. In a matter 
of weeks, prices for bulbs fell to three- 
quarters, a half, one-quarter their previous 
quotations. Thousands of people were 
bankrupted.
This classic example of speculation be­
came known as tulipomania—look that up 
in your Funk & Wagnall’s—and you will 
find it listed there today. Tulipomania was 
a manifestation of what we would now call 
“commodity trading.” Another hundred 
years had to pass before financial sophisti­
cation reached a point where speculation 
could take place with pieces of paper 
standing as symbols for values less tangi­
ble than a commodity.
In economic history, the first instances 
of modern speculative finance were the 
South Sea Company organized in England 
in 1711 and the Occidental Company or­
ganized in France in 1717. The basic idea 
was similar in both cases. The companies 
would assume a large part of the debt obli­
gations of the respective governments in 
return for certain monopoly privileges— 
trade with South America and the Pacific 
islands in the case of the English venture, 
exploitation of natural resources in the 
Mississippi Valley in the case of the 
French venture.
Shares were offered to the public, and 
the aura of romance surrounding the South 
Seas and the New World made the stocks 
real glamour issues. The prices rose gid­
dily, with the result that the stock could 
be used as collateral for bigger and bigger 
borrowings. The promoters issued addi­
tional shares, which were used to acquire 
more properties. Within just a few years, 
the price of South Seas stock rose 700 per 
cent. People from all levels of society 
scrambled to get aboard.
The only catch was that the underlying 
assets were not worth what the stock was 
selling for, nor could they be worth so 
much in the foreseeable future.
The South Sea Bubble burst in England, 
and the Mississippi Bubble in France, in 
the same year—1720. A few lucky specula­
tors who had taken their profits earlier 
made fortunes. But thousands upon thou­
sands of people lost everything they had.
The stock of the Bank of England itself 
fell by half in four months. Many lesser 
banks failed. There were government in­
vestigations. Some people who feared in­
vestigation or who could not meet their 
debts fled abroad. Panic reigned.
That was long ago, and conditions 
change. Thus, it was many years later 
when one of the best known economists in 
the United States could allay the worries 
that a few people felt by declaring, “Stock 
prices have reached what looks like a per­
manently high plateau.”
The economist was Professor Irving 
Fisher of Yale, and the time of this pro­
nouncement was 1929. Nor was Professor 
Fisher alone in his belief. It was shared 
by other academic economists and by such 
prestigious figures as John J. Raskob, who 
had just resigned as chairman of the Fi­
nance Committee of General Motors to 
become chairman of the Democratic Na­
tional Committee, and Charles Mitchell, 
president of the National City Bank in 
New York.
And why not? During 1928 the price of 
Allied Chemical stock had gone from 154 
to 250; Chrysler from 63 to 132; General 
Electric from 136 to 221.
In relating these events, I cannot help 
remembering that in a speech to the House 
of Burgesses in colonial Virginia, Patrick 
Henry said: “Caesar had his Brutus; 
Charles the First his Cromwell; and 
George the Third . . .”—whereupon there 
were cries of “Treason” from his fellow­
members—and he went on “. . . and 
George the Third may profit from their 
example. If this be treason, make the most 
of it.”
Like Mr. Henry, I am not pushing any 
parallels to conclusions. If persons in the 
audience wish to do so, that is up to them.
My reason for recalling episodes of his­
tory is that businessmen are generally so 
engrossed in dealing with the affairs of 
today and in planning for the future (as 
indeed they should be) that they seldom 
have time to think seriously about any­
thing that happened prior to their own 
business lifetimes. Yet, as George Santa­
yana has noted, “Those who fail to under­
stand the lessons of history are condemned 
to repeat its errors.”
All of us today realize that in the past 
few years the stock market—or at least 
certain sectors of it—have been, shall we 
say—exuberant. Whether the exuberance 
is of such a degree as to imply a wide­
spread danger, I am not enough of a 
prophet to say. In recent weeks the market 
has drifted downward but concern over 
speculation remains. Just a few days ago 
the new chairman of the SEC testified be­
fore a Congressional committee about the 
causes and results of speculative activity in 
the market, and recently another SEC 
commissioner spoke of “the undesirable 
effects of the super-heated speculative 
fever now existing in our markets.”
I would remind you that some new-issue 
offerings of stock in franchised restau­
rants, nursing homes, and so on—presum­
ably priced by the underwriters at levels 
regarded as reflecting fair values—have 
risen two, four, or even eight times the 
original price in a matter of months. Stocks 
of some old-line companies, with millions 
of shares outstanding, have leaped sharply 
in reaction to take-over bids. It is difficult 
to believe that a company which has had 
a market valuation in the neighborhood, 
say, of $400 million for the past year or so 
is suddenly worth 50 per cent more.
Occurrences of this sort should con­cern all businessmen, since if exces­
sive exuberance were to lead to excessive 
reaction, it would be bad for all business.
And such occurrences concern certified 
public accountants not only because of 
their function of reviewing the financial 
statements of companies whose shares are 
traded but because, as professional men, 
they have a public responsibility.
The accounting profession has taken 
some positive actions to meet its responsi­
bilities in this respect, and it is trying to 
take more.
Let me make clear that CPAs are not 
dogmatically against speculation. They 
fully realize that, within reasonable 
bounds, it plays an economically useful 
role. CPAs realize, too, that the roots of 
speculation lie in mankind’s age-old de­
sire to get something for nothing, and they 
have no hope or intention of trying to 
change human nature.
At the same time, however, CPAs real­
ize that speculation has undoubtedly been 
stimulated by some corporate accounting 
practices, and they want to keep specula­
tive fever from being aggravated by inade­
quate or potentially misleading corporate 
financial data. They want such data to be 
as reliable as possible and as revealing as 
practicable. If large numbers of the public 
do not read the information or, having 
read it, choose not to heed it, that is their 
decision.
To return for a moment to my reference 
to the speculation in 17th Century Hol­
land, if people want to pay ridiculous 
prices for tulip bulbs, okay. But they 
should have the means for knowing 
whether they are buying tulip bulbs or 
onions.
Today, the tulip bulbs are convertible 
preferred stocks, convertible debentures— 
and the latest darling, warrants—which 
some business journalists have called 
“funny money.” And the investor would 
be well advised to tip-toe carefully through 
these tulips or he may end up in the onion 
patch. All of this is part of the current 
emphasis on “performance” and the crea­
tion of “instant earnings.”
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED 
public accountants is in the forefront 
of those trying to establish fair standards 
of corporate reporting in the face of the 
ingenious kinds of securities, and pack­
ages of securities, conceived by imagina­
tive financiers. The Institute’s efforts in 
this direction take the form largely of 
Opinions of its Accounting Principles 
Board. The efforts have had the general 
support of the SEC, the stock exchanges, 
and a good many bankers and business­
men. They have also encountered business 
opposition.
Probably everyone in an audience such 
as this is familiar with the several Opin­
ions which the Accounting Principles 
Board has issued in the past couple of 
years or which it has proposed and cir­
culated to the business community for 
comment. But let me tell you briefly about 
one problem area of special significance.
As we all know, the one figure in a com­
pany’s annual report which the average 
stock-buyer pays more attention to than 
any other is the company’s earnings per 
share. This is the figure that is reported 
prominently in the newspapers; and, of 
course, it is a figure that not only amateur 
investors but the sophisticated ones also 
take into account.
So it’s important to note that the recent 
pronouncements made or proposed by the 
Accounting Principles Board bear on the 
earnings-per-share figure one way or an­
other.
Two years ago last January the Board 
issued Opinion 9, which did several things. 
For one, it said that extraordinary gains or 
losses should be included in a company’s 
reported net income. Previously, as you 
know, a company might add a nonrecur­
ring gain to, or deduct a nonrecurring loss 
from, its net income figure, depending on 
whether management felt it desirable to 
raise or lower the figure. Conversely, if 
management did not want the gain or loss 
to affect the reported net, it could credit 
or charge the amount to retained earnings, 
which would not show in the income state­
ment but in the analysis of retained earn­
ings. It was more common to see an ex­
traordinary gain in net income and the 
extraordinary loss in retained earnings. 
Obviously, this option could hamper com­
parison of a company’s earnings from one 
year to another, or comparison as between 
two different companies. That option has 
now been closed.
Opinion 9 did something else. Custo­
marily, a company’s formal financial state­
ments have shown net income as a total 
figure—the earnings per share figure has 
been somewhere else in the report to stock­
holders, probably in the President’s Letter 
and the “Highlights of the Year,” which 
are in the opening pages.
An auditor renders his opinion only on 
the formal financial statements—not on 
the President’s Letter or any other part of 
an annual report. Opinion 9 “strongly 
Recommended” that the per-share figure be 
on the face of the financial statements. Al­
though this was only a recommendation, 
many companies promptly adopted the 
practice, and it is now contemplated to 
make inclusion of the per-share figure ne­
cessary if an auditor is to give a so-called 
“clean” opinion on a company’s financial 
statements.
Further, Opinion 9 recommended that 
reports for companies having potential 
dilution in earnings applicable to common 
stock should carry two earnings-per-share 
figures that is, a so-called primary earn­
ings per share, and also a fully diluted 
figure to show what the earnings would be 
if all convertible securities and other con­
tingent issues were to be exchanged for 
common stock.
Still further, it said that the number of 
common shares used as the divisor in com­
puting the primary figure should include 
the number of shares which could be de­
manded by holders of convertible securi­
ties which derive a substantial part of their 
value from their convertibility. These 
were termed residual securities in recogni­
tion of their substantial equivalence to 
common stock.
In a nutshell, the primary earnings- 
per-share figure would be based on the 
number of common shares outstanding 
plus the number of shares assignable to 
convertible securities having “common 
stock equivalency”; and the fully diluted 
figure would be based on the outstanding 
common plus all convertible securities, 
whether or not they met the criteria of 
“common stock equivalency.”
Opinion 9 came at an opportune time, 
for a wave of complicated securities was 
rising, often in connection with mergers 
and acquisitions. Some securities were so 
imaginatively conceived that earnings per 
share computed by the traditional method 
could be enhanced simply by issuance of 
the security. For example, common stock­
holders might be offered in exchange for 
their shares a so-called convertible pre­
ferred stock paying no dividend but carry­
ing the right to convert back into common 
stock at a rate increasing over the years. 
Although the value of the preferred would 
depend entirely on its substantial equiva­
lence to common stock, earnings per share 
computed by the usual method would be 
increased because of the reduced number 
of common shares outstanding. This was 
a situation the Board felt required 
correcting.
Opinion 9 did that, but experience with 
it has revealed a need to expand and clar­
ify the meaning of residual securities. The 
Board is now doing that.
T AST NOVEMBER THE BOARD EXPOSED an­
other proposed Opinion on earnings 
per share, one that is drawing heavy oppo­
sition from some corporate managements. 
With the exposure period over and com­
ments received, the APB will consider 
further action on this matter.
Whereas virtually everyone is agreed 
that some convertible securities have so 
many of the market attributes of common 
stock that they ought logically to be in­
cluded with common in computing earn­
ings per share, the criteria for determining 
common stock equivalency can be framed 
in different ways. The problem lies in how 
and where to draw the line between gim­
micky securities which might give rise to 
misleading reporting and solid senior se­
curities with reasonable added attractions. 
A lot of deep thinking and debate are tak­
ing place on the subject.
Very likely the Accounting Principles 
Board will arrive at the conclusion that a 
convertible security—either debenture or 
preferred stock—will be considered as the 
equivalent of common stock when its 
terms are substantially equivalent to those 
of the common stock, or when its yield at 
the time of its issuance is such as to pre­
clude its classification as a senior security. 
Thus, if the cash yield of a convertible se­
curity is far below the prevailing rate for 
non-convertible long-term debt or non­
convertible preferred stock of the same 
corporation, the security would be con­
sidered as a common stock equivalent.
Further establishment of a minimum 
rate of demarcation for common stock 
equivalency would go far toward clarifying 
the general principle laid down in Opinion 
9. But even without this needed clarifica­
tion, Opinion 9 has served to effectively 
limit the ability of imaginative financiers 
to use convertible securities to aid in re­
porting “instant earnings.” Recently, The 
New York Times said that John M. Hart­
well, president of the Hartwell & Camp­
bell Fund, in connection with his fund 
“pronounced the benediction on the con­
glomerates which he said were hurt when 
the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants changed the rules to require 
conglomerates to report their earnings on 
a fully diluted basis.”
The attention given in Opinion 9 to 
convertible securities, and the lack of 
attention to warrants, have fostered a 
marked increase in the use of warrants to 
accomplish instant performance. This pre­
sents a new challenge to the Board, and 
it is about to respond by pronouncing that 
warrants—and options and rights as well 
—should be regarded as common stock 
equivalents at all times until they are exer­
cised or expire. Where warrants are out­
standing, earnings per share (primary and 
fully diluted) should be computed by add­
ing to the common shares outstanding the 
number of common shares issuable upon 
exercise of the warrants, less the number 
of common shares that could be purchased 
with the proceeds from the exercise of all 
warrants.
The objective here is not to stop the 
  issuance of warrants but to stop the 
reporting of earnings per share without 
giving appropriate recognition to the 
heavy impact of potential dilution.
But this is only a part of the story of the 
warrant, a truly wondrous security—if it 
can be called that—because of its leverage 
and speculative advantages.
Some companies have issued warrants 
to present stockholders in exchange for 
nothing. The New York Stock Exchange, 
with the agreement of the accounting pro­
fession, has made this ploy less appealing 
by requiring the warrants to be accounted 
for as if they were stock dividends. That 
is, retained earnings must be capitalized 
in the amount of the fair market value of 
the warrants. Since this requirement has 
been made known, some companies have 
withdrawn proposals to issue warrants. 
Incidentally, the Exchange has a policy of 
refusing to list long-term warrants because 
of the problems they have historically 
created.
Warrants also have been issued in con­
nection with takeovers of other companies, 
and issuing companies have tried to apply 
pooling of interests accounting to the 
transactions. The accounting profession 
has prohibited this practice by a less for­
mal means than an Accounting Principles 
Board Opinion.
All these actions and proposals have 
come about, not because accountants like 
to make life more complicated than it is 
already, but because businessmen them­
selves have devised complicated ways to 
acquire and finance companies. CPAs do 
not take a stand as to whether acquisitions 
and conglomerations are good, bad, or 
indifferent from a standpoint of economic 
or social principle. But they have been 
confronted with tough problems of how 
to handle these matters in financial state­
ments in a way that will be fair to the 
investing public.
The accounting profession feels these 
problems have to be dealt with because 
financing has come to involve such a large 
number of warrants and convertible issues 
(including some with conversion rates 
which change at different periods of time) 
that the customary way of computing 
earnings per share is no longer adequate. 
Some financing arrangements have been so 
structured, in fact, as to result in what 
might be called “ersatz earnings.”
Convertible securities have been issued 
particularly to form conglomerate com­
panies, a phenomenon which is drawing 
increasing attention from Congress and 
the SEC. No less than six Congressional 
committees are investigating conglomer­
ates this year and competition for star wit­
nesses is likely to grow intense. Also the 
popular press has found conglomerates to 
be newsworthy; a recent cover story in 
Time magazine dealt with the subject.
In attempting to shed light on conglom­
erate companies, the American Institute 
of CPAs proposed in September, 1967 that 
highly diversified companies undertake an 
experimental reporting of revenues and 
earnings by broad industry segments as a 
means of helping investors appraise corpo­
rate operations. Last fall the SEC pro­
posed regulations that would require 
product-line reporting in registration 
statements related to new filings, and at 
that time the Institute agreed with the ob­
jective but not with some of the details for 
implementation.
A few weeks ago the Commission an­
nounced a revised proposal, which gives 
effect to most of the suggestions made by 
the Institute. The Institute now endorses 
this proposal, except for one feature which 
appears to be ambiguous and potentially 
incapable of being implemented. The Ac­
counting Principles Board is now consider­
ing the need for an Opinion dealing with 
product-line figures in financial state­
ments reported on by CPAs.
The conglomerate movement has led 
the profession to take a new look also at 
the pooling concept. In the fall of 1968, the 
Institute released a research study in 
which the authors took the position that, 
except in certain specified and relatively 
infrequent circumstances, all acquisitions 
should be treated as purchases. Not every­
one within the accounting profession or 
outside it agrees with this, and the subject 
is under continuing study.
Nearly everyone agrees, however, that 
some tightening of accounting rules is 
needed in this area, even though there is 
a wide diversity of views. At one extreme, 
some would add mild restraints but essen­
tially preserve the status quo. At another 
extreme, some favor abandoning pooling 
entirely, and requiring the capitalization 
of goodwill and subsequent amortization 
by systematic charges to income.
Many contend that pooling-of-interests 
accounting fails to provide a fair account­
ing for the cost of an acquired company. 
By carrying forward old historical 
amounts from the books of the acquired 
company, the combined enterprise avoids 
the capitalization and subsequent charge 
to income of high acquisition costs in terms 
of cash and securities. If poolings were 
outlawed and purchase accounting re­
quired, with amortization of all costs in­
cluding goodwill, the merger movement 
would be significantly curtailed. Many if 
not most acquisitions could not be justi­
fied in terms of future flow of income if 
earnings had to be charged for the full 
costs involved.
As matters now stand, however, the tax 
laws and accounting concepts, taken in 
conjunction, present a situation in which 
Company A, whose stock has a high price­
earnings ratio in the market, can issue 
new shares in exchange for the stock of 
Company B, which sells at a lower P/E; 
and Company A’s stock will instantly 
show higher earnings per share even 
though the actual dollar-amount of earn­
ings by the combined companies is un­
changed. Isn’t this the kind of mirage­
value that attached to the tulip bulbs?
With pooling accounting, an acquiring 
company can sell investments or other 
assets which are undervalued on the books 
of the acquired company and report in­
stant earnings of sizable amounts. With 
this kind of earnings magic possible, it is 
no wonder that soundly-managed, con­
servatively-financed companies of all sizes 
have become targets for takeovers. Even 
some of our very largest banks have been 
sought by relatively small conglomerates.
And this same phenomenon has prompted a predictable defensive 
course of action for managements of tar­
get companies who look over their 
shoulders and see some one gaining on 
them. One defensive tactic is to revalue 
assets upwards to the extent possible with­
in the range of generally accepted account­
ing principles. In 1968, there were more 
voluntary changes from one acceptable 
accounting method to another than in any 
year in recent history. All such changes 
that have come to my attention have been 
from a conservative method to a liberal 
method—from accelerated depreciation to 
straight line, from deferral of investment 
credit to flow-through, from expensing of 
research and development to capitaliza­
tion, from lifo inventory valuation to fifo. 
These changes all have the effect of report­
ing higher asset values and higher current 
income.
That these alternatives exist is a huge 
problem area for the Accounting Princi­
ples Board, which is dedicated to narrow­
ing the range of acceptable accounting 
methods. But with the complexity of the 
many specific problems, alternatives in 
some accounting areas are going to con­
tinue unless and until criteria can be es­
tablished for determining when specific 
methods should be used.
In the accounting profession's drive 
  for improved corporate financial re­
porting, the banking community has been 
for the most part a staunch ally. Bankers 
have offered much encouragement and co­
operation to the Accounting Principles 
Board in its efforts, and occasionally bank­
ers have been among the sharpest critics of 
accounting, followed by business in gen­
eral. But these same attitudes have not 
always prevailed when it comes to ac­
counting and reporting for banks
Of particular interest to banking groups 
are the discussions which representatives 
of the accounting profession have been 
having lately with representatives of the 
banking business and of the regulatory 
authorities. As you know, the reports of 
banks to their stockholders, with a few 
prominent exceptions, speak of Net Oper­
ating Earnings the way other businesses 
speak of Net Income. For example, if the 
President’s Letter to the Stockholders re­
fers to a new record in “earnings”, Net 
Operating Earnings is what is meant. If 
an earnings-per-share figure is shown on 
the face of the income statement, it is 
based on Net Operating Earnings.
Banks do not present a figure for “net 
income.” But net operating earnings do 
not reflect provision for loan losses or 
gains and losses on sales of securities. 
Bank income statements follow a format 
required for reporting to regulatory agen­
cies, who are concerned mainly with sol­
vency and protection of depositors. But 
even for this purpose, no one can justify 
the omission of a loan loss provision from 
net operating earnings. A preferential in­
come tax treatment complicates computa­
tion of reasonable provision for loan losses, 
but it does not make it impossible. Loan 
losses are operating expenses of banks, 
just as they are operating expenses of all 
businesses that grant credit. Thus, the 
operating results of an entire industry are 
overstated. Investors in bank stocks need 
a fair presentation of income and the Ac­
counting Principles Board is trying to fill 
that need—in the face of considerable 
opposition. It is not far-fetched to say that 
the way banks now report to their stock­
holders could be the basis for a conundrum 
like this—Question: “When is a loss not a 
loss?” Answer: “When it happens to a 
bank.”
Both the bankers and the CPAs are in 
quite close agreement conceptually, how­
ever, and although there are details of ap­
plication to be worked out, I believe this 
can be done and that the reporting by 
banks to their stockholders will soon be 
more in accord with that of the business 
world generally. This development is the 
more important because of an apparently 
growing interest in bank stocks among 
investors.
MY COMMENTS HAVE BEEN FOCUSED ON 
problems of financial reporting and 
efforts of the APB to deal with these prob­
lems. This is only one aspect of the pro­
gram of the American Institute to improve 
financial reporting and the professional 
standards of performance of its members. 
These efforts and the self-regulation of 
stock exchanges and other institutions in 
the financial community are essential if 
the free enterprise system is to continue as 
we know it.
History shows that the free enterprise 
system can fall into disfavor as a result 
of lack of foresight, self-discipline and re­
sponsibility. Such episodes are unfortu­
nate not only because the system is the 
most efficient for producing goods and 
providing services but because it is the 
one most consistent with individual free­
dom. The price of maintaining the system 
is constant vigilance against excesses and 
laxity. Every one of us who plays a respon­
sible role in it must do his part.
ADDENDUM
A few days after Mr. Savoie’s address, 
the Institute’s Accounting Principles 
Board approved two new Opinions and 
reached general agreement on a third.
. .. Commercial banks must now report 
a net income figure, including provi­
sions for loan losses and results of se­
curity transactions.
. . . No accounting recognition is to be 
given to the conversion feature of con­
vertible debt, because of the insepara­
bility of the debt and equity features. A 
value should be attributed to detach­
able warrants, however, determined at 
or shortly after time of issuance.
. . . Substantial agreement was reached 
on an Opinion dealing with earnings 
per share; in particular that earnings 
per share figures should appear on the 
face of the income statement and that 
the determination of the common stock 
equivalency of a convertible security 
should be made only at time of issu­
ance.
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